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1 Introduction 
More than 215 million people currently live outside their country of birth. In 2010 alone, 
they sent remittances worth US$ 325 billion, equivalent to three times the amount of 
official development assistance, to their families in their home countries (World Bank, 
2011). With international migration and remittances on the rise, migrant-sending countries 
are increasingly recognizing the development potential of their diasporas. Many developing 
countries are trying to actively engage their emigrants in the development of their home 
country. Recent efforts have focused on encouraging migrants to contribute to the 
provision of local public goods such as infrastructure in their home communities (Newland 
et al., 2010). Donations from migrants are often channeled to community investment 
projects through home town associations based in host countries, with the active support 
of governments and NGOs both in the host country and the country of origin. Such 
donations by migrants have been termed “collective remittances” (Goldring, 2004), as 
opposed to “family remittances” (sent by migrants directly to family members or friends 
for their private benefit). 
While collective remittances have attracted considerable interest from policy-makers and 
development donors, there exists little substantive research to guide possible policy 
interventions. The few existing studies focus on the role of migrant associations in 
improving public services and infrastructure. Beauchemin and Schoumaker (2009) find that 
migrant associations in rural Burkina Faso helped to provide schools, health centers, and 
all-season roads, but had no significant impact on agricultural productivity or access to 
basic infrastructure. Adida and Girod (2011) caution that the perceived positive correlation 
between access to water services and the incidence of emigration across localities in Mexico 
may reflect private, rather than collective remittances as households link up to existing 
fresh water pipes and install septic tanks on their own grounds. Aparicio and Meseguer 
(2012) study the determinants of the use of the Mexican 3x1 program, a public fund that 
matches migrant contributions to community projects with public resources amounting to 
three times the migrant contribution. They find that poorer communities are less likely to 
participate and that the program is politically biased. 
Very little is known about why migrants engage in collective remittances. It is not clear a 
priori whether economic theories that explain the motives of family remittances or 
philanthropic behavior in general also apply to collective remittances. This is a serious gap 
in knowledge because migrants are, after all, a highly heterogeneous group with respect to 
the time horizon of the migration decision (permanent vs. temporary migration) as well as 
the level of attachment to their home communities (migration with vs. without family 
members). It seems likely that the willingness to contribute to the provision of public 
goods at home depends on an individual’s migration pattern. Therefore, a better 
understanding of the linkage between migration patterns and migrants’ willingness to 
donate will permit a more realistic assessment of the size and possible development impact 
of collective remittances and help to design and target appropriate policy interventions. 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the motives for collective 
remittances. We draw on the literature both on migrant remittances and philanthropy in 
general to identify possible motives. Altruism is an obvious starting point – both pure 
altruism where an individual’s utility function includes the wellbeing of a person close to 
her, and impure altruism where an individual derives utility from the act of giving itself. 
Other possible motives are related to the migration situation. Collective remittances may be 
part of an exchange between the migrant and the community. In this case, migrants would 
donate to compensate members of their community of origin for services provided directly 
or indirectly to household members left behind (e.g., additional support for migrants’ 
children through teachers and other community members). Donations may also allow 
migrants to remain in good standing with their community of origin and to preserve 
implicit or explicit membership rights, in case they ever decide to return home for good. 
After developing a theoretical framework, we analyze the philanthropic behavior of an 
individual migrant empirically. Specifically, we relate the migrant’s decision to donate to a 
community project to a set of migrant, household, and community variables that we 
interpret as indicative of particular motives. Our analysis is based on a nationally 
representative household survey conducted in 2008 from Moldova with a special focus on 
migration and remittances. Moldova, a South-East European country with a high 
prevalence of emigration, is a highly suitable case for our study. First, Moldovan migrants 
are heterogeneous along several dimensions: They are widely dispersed across different 
destination countries, ranging from Russia to Western Europe, Turkey and other countries. 
Within individual destination countries, migration patterns also vary widely with respect to 
legal status, seasonality of migration, and return intention. We exploit this variation to test 
for the existence of several motives for collective remittances. Second, although the 
Moldovan government has recently begun to develop diaspora policies, no such efforts 
existed in 2008, the year in which the survey was conducted. Therefore, migrants’ 
preferences and behavior as measured in the survey were not yet affected by policies to 
promote migrant philanthropy. In other words, our data are likely to reflect migrants’ 
undistorted preferences to contribute to the development of their home communities. 
In addition to analyzing the motives of donations by migrants, we also analyze donations to 
community projects by domestic members of the migrant’s household of origin. We do so 
to account for the fact that the migrant and her domestic household members may still 
belong to the same household, sharing a budget and a decision-making process on financial 
matters. Therefore, a donation by the migrant, or more generally, a donation financed from 
the additional income earned by the migrant, may well be channeled through domestic 
household members. 
Finally, we investigate whether households with a migrant abroad are more likely to 
contribute to community projects than households without a migrant. On the one hand, 
migrant households tend to be richer while relying more than others on support from 
community members. If they are also more likely to donate than non-migrant households, 
this would represent one channel through which migration and remittances benefit the 
community at large, rather than only migrant households. On the other hand, migrant 
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households may be less involved in community affairs because their higher income allows 
them to purchase services privately and makes them more self-sufficient (Abdih et al., 
forthcoming). 
We find that migrants are more likely to donate if (i) their income is higher, (ii) they 
frequently communicate with household members left behind, (iii) they expect ultimately to 
return to their home country, (iv) their status in the destination country is insecure, (v) 
more dependent children and elderly live in their household of origin, (vi) their local 
community is more ethnically homogeneous, and (vii) migration flows from their 
community are concentrated on few destination countries. These findings suggest that 
collective remittances are driven by a mix of motives, including altruism, exchange, and 
concern about future membership rights in the community of origin. We find the same 
motives to be relevant for donations of migrant households. We do not find that 
households with a migrant abroad are significantly more likely to donate to community 
projects than households without migrants. 
2 Theoretical Framework 
We define collective remittances as donations by migrants to community projects in their 
home communities. Community projects are characterized as not only benefiting the 
domestic members of migrants’ households, but potentially all community members. 
Therefore, collective remittances are best conceptualized as migrants’ private contributions 
towards the provision of local public goods. 
2.1 Motives for Collective Remittances 
To understand possible motives for collective remittances, we build on insights from the 
literatures on migrant remittances and on philanthropic behavior in general (see Rapoport 
and Docquier, 2006, and Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011, or Andreoni, 2006, for an 
overview). The two strands of literature capture different subsets of the potentially relevant 
features of collective remittances. The literature on the motives for migrant remittances is 
instructive on the behavior of migrants, but focuses on private transfers to family 
members, not donations to community projects. By contrast, the general literature on 
philanthropy is instructive on the motives for donations, but has little to say on how 
migration affects the decision to donate. From these diverse literatures, altruism, exchange, 
and securing membership rights in home communities emerge as key potential motives for 
collective remittances. In addition, community diversity, which arises from ethnic diversity 
in the home communities and the dispersion of migrants across destination countries, may 
affect the level of collective remittances. 
Altruism. Pure altruism implies that an individual cares about the well-being of others; 
more technically, the well-being of others becomes part of her utility function. If the 
“others” are worse off, utility maximization typically leads to a transfer of income. 
Collective remittances to provide public goods are one way in which (better-off) migrants 
can improve the welfare of (worse-off) individuals in their home communities. The related 
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notion of impure altruism suggests that a philanthropist may also derive utility from the act 
of giving itself, e.g. by being able to look upon herself as a “giving” person who conforms 
to a certain standard of ethical behavior. The fact that migrants typically experience 
enormous income gains from moving abroad (Clemens et al., 2008; McKenzie et al., 2010) 
suggests a potentially strong role of altruism as a motive for collective remittances. 
Numerous empirical studies on migrant remittances and private transfers reviewed by 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) conclude that altruism matters because important empirical 
regularities can only be understood if donors care about the welfare of recipients. Similarly, 
empirical studies of charitable giving reviewed by Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) find that 
donors are concerned about the welfare of the recipients of charity-provided services. 
Exchange. Like private remittances, collective remittances may be part of a direct or 
indirect exchange between the migrant and the community. For example, migrants may 
leave behind children or elderly dependents who rely disproportionately on support from 
other community members such as neighbors or teachers. Collective remittances may 
compensate these community members for their extra efforts either directly or indirectly, 
depending on the nature of the community project. An example for exchange as a motive 
for private remittances is described in the study by Lucas and Stark (1985). They document 
for Botswana that migrant sons typically leave their cattle with the household of origin and 
compensate family members for looking after the cattle with remittances. Studies on 
charitable giving also find that giving may be influenced by exchange motives, such as 
when donors benefit from the services of the charities they support (see Bekkers and 
Wiepking, 2011). 
Securing community membership rights. Migrants may also send collective remittances 
to secure membership rights in their home communities. For example, by supporting a 
community project, migrants may seek to remain in good standing with their peers and 
maintain social capital that will facilitate their eventual return. In this sense, collective 
remittances may be viewed as enhancing the migrant’s (or her household’s) reputation 
within the community. In a study on housing investments by Nigerian migrants in their 
home towns, Osili (2004) finds that migrants invest in housing in order to safeguard 
membership in their communities of origin. Membership rights are particularly important, 
if migrants ever decide to return home for good. Similarly, Dustmann and Mestres (2010) 
find that temporary migrants are more likely to remit than permanent migrants. Delpierre 
and Verheyden (2010) develop a theory of migrants’ decisions to remit and save under 
uncertainty regarding their future location. They find that insecure legal status (with respect 
to residence or work) will result in higher remittances because it makes the option to return 
home particularly valuable. Relatedly, the literature on the motives for private remittances 
has suggested a role for securing inheritance rights. In their famous study on Botswana, 
Lucas and Stark (1985) show that sons (who generally inherit) remit more to parents with 
large cattle herds than daughters (who generally do not inherit). While sons and daughters 
presumably both care about the welfare of their parents, the difference in behavior is best 
explained by sons’ concern to secure their inheritance rights. Similarly, empirical studies of 
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charitable giving document that reputation is an important motive for donations (Bekkers 
and Wiepking, 2011). 
Community diversity. Collective remittances are likely to be affected by community 
characteristics that determine the homogeneity of community members’ preferences 
towards public goods, transaction costs for agreeing upon and implementing collective 
action, or the degree of trust among community members. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) 
find that participation in social activities is significantly lower in more unequal and in more 
racially or ethnically fragmented localities. Okten and Osili (2004) document that ethnic 
diversity in Indonesia is negatively correlated with monetary and time contributions to 
community organizations as well as with the prevalence of community organizations. 
Similarly, Andreoni et al. (2011) conclude from Canadian tax records that ethnic and 
religious diversity significantly reduce charitable contributions, though not the likelihood of 
donating at all.  
The emerging role of migrant diasporas in promoting migrant philanthropy (Newland et al., 
2010) suggests that collective remittances may be affected not only by diversity in the 
communities of origin, but also by the strength of migrant networks from a given 
community. One determinant of network strength is the degree of concentration of 
migrants across destination countries. The concentration of migrants from a given 
community in one destination country (possibly even in one destination city) is likely to 
facilitate communication and agreement among the diaspora on financing public goods at 
home. 
2.2 Predicted Effects of Migrant, Household, and Community 
Characteristics 
Our empirical analysis uses variables at the migrant, household and community level to 
identify the motives for collective remittances. Some variables are closely related to one 
particular motive. Other variables may reflect more than one motive because the different 
motives are not mutually exclusive. Table 1 lists important migrant, household, and 
community characteristics along with their expected effect (ceteris paribus) on the donation 
decision, distinguishing between the main motives for collective remittances: altruism, 
exchange, and membership rights, along with community diversity as an intervening factor. 
If altruism is an important motive, we firmly expect collective remittances to increase with 
a migrant’s income and decrease with the level of development of her community of origin. 
Collective remittances should also rise if the migrant’s domestic household members are 
better off or if the migrant is in frequent contact with family or other community members, 
suggesting greater emotional attachment. Conversely, a more diverse community may be 
characterized by less trust and, hence, less emotional attachment and lower collective 
remittances. 
We expect exchange motives for collective remittances to be related, above all else, to the 
presence and number of children and elderly members in the migrant’s household at home. 
On the one hand, dependent household members may benefit particularly from the public 
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goods financed from collective remittances. On the other hand, children and elderly left 
behind may receive various forms of support from community members. By helping to 
provide public goods, the migrant may show appreciation and offer compensation. A 
community’s demand for compensation and the migrant’s ability to meet it increase with 
the migrant’s economic success abroad. Hence, collective remittances should increase with 
the migrant’s income. Communities with high rates of emigration may particularly benefit 
from exchange arrangements with their migrants. We therefore expect them to see higher 
inflows of collective remittances. 
If securing membership rights in the home community is an important motive, we 
firmly expect to find collective remittances to be correlated with the migrant’s probability 
of return. Likewise, closer links with family and community members, the presence of 
dependent family members, greater household wealth, and a higher level of economic 
development may all increase the value of membership rights in the community and hence 
render collective remittances more likely. By contrast, ethnic fragmentation and the 
resulting lack of trust may make it less attractive for the migrant to invest in securing 
membership rights through collective remittances. The effect of higher migrant income is 
ambiguous: On the one hand, better-off migrants have more resources to invest in securing 
membership rights; on the other hand, higher income in the destination country decreases 
the value of the return option. 
If community diversity matters, we firmly expect a negative effect on collective 
remittances from ethnic fragmentation of community members (through heterogeneous 
preferences, higher transaction costs, or less trust). Similarly, for a given level of migration, 
more fractionalized migration flows may be associated with weaker migrant networks and 
make collective remittances less likely. Likewise, for a given level of diversity, more 
migrants may strengthen the network and encourage diaspora activities. Therefore, the 
community-level prevalence of migration should be positively correlated with collective 
remittances. 
3 Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Data 
Our analysis of the motives for collective remittances requires data at the migrant, 
household and community level. We draw on a unique combination of data sets for 
Moldova. Our main source is the IOM-CBSAXA household survey from 2008 that was 
specifically designed to analyze patterns of migration and remittances. The survey is 
particularly well-suited to study the motives for migrant donations because it includes 
migrant- and household-level information on monetary contributions to community 
projects as well as a wide range of socio-economic characteristics. With a total sample size 
of almost 4,000 households, the survey was designed to be representative for Moldova as a 
whole (excluding the secessionist region of Transnistria), for each major geographic region 
(North, Center, South, and the region around the capital of Chisinau), and for different 
locality sizes (large cities: Chisinau and Balti, other towns, and villages). Interviews were 
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generally conducted with the household head who provided information on the household 
and all its individual members including any migrant members abroad.  
The survey not only inquired about migrants who were still members of the household at 
the time of the interview, but also about any former members who no longer belonged to 
the household because they had permanently settled abroad. This feature in combination 
with the fact that the emigration of whole households is still a rare phenomenon in 
Moldova limits the possibility that the survey misses migrants who move, but do not have 
households left to report on them. Therefore, the survey covers a wide range of diaspora 
groups and renders our analysis more representative of the diaspora as a whole. The survey 
defines a migrant as an individual who was abroad at the time of the interview or for at 
least three months during the 12 months preceding the interview (see Luecke et al., 2007 
and 2009 for more information on the survey). 
We restrict our sample to localities with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants. Moldova is a largely 
rural country, with only four cities or towns exceeding 30,000 inhabitants. By focusing on 
rural areas and small towns, we ensure that we do not compare migrants and households 
across localities of very different size because these may also differ in important 
unobservable dimensions. In addition, small localities are more likely to adequately capture 
the boundaries of communities that share and contribute to local public goods. The 
resulting sample consists of 1,281 migrants and 2,736 households. 
In the remainder of this section, we describe the main variables suggested by our 
theoretical framework and also introduce the other data sets that we combine with the 
household survey. Appendix Tables A1 to A3 provide an overview and summary statistics 
of all variables used in our analysis. 
Donations to community projects. Our main outcome of interest is whether or not a 
migrant has made a monetary contribution to a community project. For every migrant, the 
survey asks whether she has previously donated money to a community project and if so, 
for what type of community project. The survey does not contain information on the 
amount donated. Similar information is available for donations to community projects by 
domestic household members in Moldova. 
One possible concern is that the interviewed household member may not be fully informed 
about the community donations of household members abroad. However, migrants are 
unlikely to keep their collective remittances secret from their relatives in Moldova. In small 
communities, the source of contributions to common projects is likely to be well-known in 
any case; a migrant may even face strong incentives to publicize her contribution if it is 
meant to compensate community members for services rendered or to protect community 
membership rights. In addition, labor migration is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
Moldova and few households have more than one member abroad. As a result, family ties 
are still strong and domestic household members should know about a migrant’s donation. 
Table 2 gives an overview over the donation patterns of migrants and domestic household 
members in households with a migrant abroad. Seven percent of the migrants as well as 43 
percent of migrant households (33 percent in non-migrant households) have donated to a 
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community project. Migrants abroad and households in Moldova share similar preferences 
regarding the type of community projects they support. Most donations go to projects that 
are targeted at children (schools, kindergarten, orphanages). Infrastructure projects 
(water/sanitation, gas, roads) constitute the second most common category. Other types of 
donations are less important. 
Migrant variables. A migrant’s likelihood to return to Moldova is captured by two 
dummy variables. The first takes the value of one if the migrant expressly intends to return 
home in the future, rather than to settle abroad. The second indicates whether a migrant’s 
status abroad is insecure, which is expected to increase the probability of an eventual return. It 
takes the value of one if the migrant has experienced a severe problem abroad, e.g. with 
local authorities or criminals or non-payment of wages. The low correlation between both 
variables (correlation coefficient of 0.08) indicates that they measure two different 
components of a migrants’ return intention. We expect both variables to increase the 
probability that a migrant will donate to a community project. 
We proxy the strength of a migrant’s family and community ties by the frequency of 
communication. This dummy variable takes the value of one if the migrant communicates 
with the household of origin more often than once a week. In the absence of a direct 
measure of the migrant’s income earned abroad, we use the number of years spent abroad as a 
proxy. We expect migration duration to be positively correlated with disposable income. 
Over the years, a migrant will have repaid her migration costs and can increasingly reap the 
benefits of economic assimilation in terms of job search and wages. Since we control for 
the frequency of communication, the duration variable should not capture loosening ties 
with the household of origin. This assertion can be tested empirically as our theoretical 
framework predicts a negative effect for weak family and community ties and a positive 
effect for income earned abroad (proxied by the number of years since departure).  
In addition to these migrant variables, we control for migrant heterogeneity in terms of age, 
sex, education level, and marital status. 
Household variables. Several motives suggest that with more children and elderly in the 
household of origin, a migrant will be more likely to contribute to a community project. 
Indeed, as shown above, most donations go to child-related projects (Table 2). We 
therefore construct two variables that count the number of individuals in the household 
aged 16 or younger and the number of individuals aged 65 or older. Another important 
household variable is the household’s living standard. We use per-capita consumption 
expenditures as a proxy for income and an asset index as a proxy for wealth. The asset 
index is the first principal component of a set of household assets which discriminate 
between rich and poor households. This set comprises ownership of a car, a washing 
machine, and a mobile phone as well as household-level access to cable or satellite 
television. 
Community variables. We draw on several datasets for community variables. At the 
municipality level, no direct measures of community-level economic development such as income, 
output or tax revenues are available. We therefore turn to high-resolution satellite data on 
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night-time light intensity from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational 
Linescan System. Recent studies (Doll et al., 2006; Sutton et al., 2007 and Henderson et al., 
2012) have shown that light intensity as captured by satellites at night is a meaningful 
measure of local economic activity. These studies document a strong positive within-
country correlation between light intensity and GDP levels and growth rates. For Moldova, 
Omar Mahmoud et al. (2012) illustrate that light intensity is strongly correlated with 
indicators of economic activity on the ground. We follow them and calculate average light 
intensity for each Moldovan locality for every year since 1992, the first year for which 
satellite images are available.  
We include two light-based variables. The first measures community light intensity in 1992 
and thus captures local economic conditions just after independence in 1991. The second 
variable measures the change in light intensity for the period 1992-1999 during which 
Moldova’s reported GDP fell by 40%. We expect this variable to capture the size of the 
economic shock suffered by each community during the transition period.  
We do not include measures of light intensity after 1999. Since mass migration from 
Moldova started in 1998/1999, it is likely that migration and the resulting inflow of 
remittances have affected local economic development and light intensity after 1999. 
Donations to community projects may be one channel through which migration affects 
community development. Therefore, measures of light intensity after 1999 are potentially 
endogenous.  
Moldova is one of very few countries that have collected detailed information on 
emigration in their population census. In addition to covering the resident population that 
was present at the time of the interview, the 2004 census also inquired about temporarily 
absent persons and their whereabouts. Temporarily absent persons are defined broadly to 
include individuals who may have lived abroad for several years as long as they maintain 
family relations with the household of origin. Typically, in Moldova, only one household 
member emigrates to earn additional income for the family. It is relatively rare even now 
for whole households to leave the country. Therefore, the 2004 census should quite 
accurately reflect the pattern of emigration. 
Since existing migrant networks largely determine the size and destination of future migrant 
flows (see Munshi, 2003 on Mexico and Goerlich and Trebesch, 2008 on Moldova), 
migration patterns found in 2004 are likely to be highly persistent and representative even 
of the situation in 2008 (the year in which the IOM-CBSAXA household survey was 
conducted). Therefore, we use 2004 census information to compute the prevalence of 
migration and the fractionalization of migration flows for each community. The community 
prevalence of migration is defined as the percentage of migrants among the total population 
(including migrants) in each community.  
In contrast to most other migrant-sending countries, Moldova has migrants in many 
different destinations. According to the 2004 census, 56 percent of the migrants were in 
Russia and 19 percent in Italy, with the rest elsewhere in the European Union (including 
Romania, Portugal, Greece, Spain, France, Germany) as well as in Ukraine, Turkey, and 
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Israel. We exploit this information to capture the fractionalization of community migration flows. 
For this purpose we construct the following migration fractionalization index (MFI) for 
each community: 
	ܯܨܫ௖ ൌ 1 െ ∑ ቂmigrants	of	community	c	in	destination	dtotal	number	of	migrants	in	community	cቃ
ଶ
ௗ      (1) 
with c indexing communities and d destinations. 
The index takes values between zero and one and indicates the probability that two 
migrants drawn at random from the same community of origin are located in different 
destinations. Probabilities close to one signal that individuals from a given community have 
migrated to many different countries, i.e. migration flows are very fragmented. This type of 
index has been widely used as a measure of ethnic diversity (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000).  
We use the same type of index to measure the ethnic fractionalization of the community of origin. 
Moldova is a multi-ethnic country. Although three fourths of the population are Moldovan, 
there are sizeable minorities of ethnic Ukrainians (8%), Russians (6%), Gagauz (4%), 
Bulgarians (2%) and others. We use information from the 2004 census on the ethnic 
composition of each community to construct the following ethnic fractionalization index 
(EFI): 
	ܧܨܫ௖ ൌ 1 െ ∑ ቂ individuals	of	ethnicity	e	in	community	ctotal	number	of	individuals	in	community	cቃ
ଶ
௘      (2) 
with c indexing communities and e ethnicities. 
Similar to the MFI, the EFI measures the probability that two individuals drawn randomly 
from the same community belong to a different ethnicity. Again, values close to one 
correspond to a high degree of fractionalization. Both the MFI and the EFI are intended to 
capture the effect of community diversity on a migrant’s probability to contribute to 
community projects. 
Finally, we introduce a measure of public transfers to the community. It is defined as per-capita 
government expenditures, including those financed from the central government budget. 
Data come from the first available round of the Village Deprivation Index in 2006. We 
control for this variable because public transfers may crowd out private contributions to 
the provision of local public goods. 
To reduce heterogeneity across communities, we also control for population size and 
inequality as proxied by the ratio of high-skilled over low-skilled individuals. Both variables 
are based on the 2004 census. 
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3.2 Econometric Framework 
3.2.1 Migrant Donations 
The focus of this paper is on the determinants of migrant donations to community 
projects. Following our theoretical framework, we model a migrant’s decision to donate as 
a function of migrant (i), household (h), and community (c) variables, allowing for district-
level (j) fixed effects. Using a simple probit model, we estimate the following empirical 
specification for migrants: 
	ܦ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ܯ௜ᇱߚ ൅ ܪ௛ᇱ ߛ ൅ ܥ௖ᇱߜ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߝ௜       (3) 
D is a dummy variable that indicates whether a migrant has made a monetary contribution 
to a community project. The vectors M, H and C represent migrant, household and 
community variables as described above. We add district-level fixed effects to address 
potential unobserved heterogeneity across communities and ensure that we only evaluate 
the determinants of migrant donations in neighboring communities. Moldova’s 35 districts 
partition the country into relatively small areas (covering 866 square kilometers and 
containing 26 local communities on average). They follow the same administrative 
boundaries as in Soviet times and have traditionally played an important role in Moldova’s 
political and economic organization. We therefore expect district-level fixed effects to 
eliminate large parts of unobserved heterogeneity that might exist across local 
communities. 
3.2.2 Donations by Domestic Household Members 
To fully assess how migration and donations to community projects are associated, we also 
analyze the determinants of donations by domestic household members, using two 
different approaches. First, we focus on migrant households because donations might be 
financed from the migrant’s income but channeled to the community project through the 
domestic members of the household of origin. The possible motives for donations 
presented in our theoretical framework, particularly exchange and community membership 
rights, are perfectly compatible with domestic household members, rather than the migrant, 
making the donation. This may be especially so if a migrant and her household of origin 
still maintain a close relationship and take joint financial decisions. We classify migrant 
households according to migrant characteristics, such as whether the migrant plans to 
return, has an insecure status abroad, or communicates several times per week, and add the 
corresponding dummy variables to the vector of household characteristics H, along with 
the number of years since the departure of the (first) migrant. The resulting empirical 
model takes the following form: 
	ܦ௠ ൌ ߙ ൅ ܪ௠ᇱ ߛ ൅ ܥ௖ᇱߜ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߝ௠       (4) 
with m indexing migrant households. D is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
domestic members of the migrant household have made a monetary contribution to a 
community project. The vector C represents the same set of community variables as in 
Equation 3. 
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Second, we examine whether domestic members of households with migrants are more 
likely to donate than households without migrants. The resulting sample contains all 
migrant and non-migrant households in the IOM-CBSAXA survey that reside in localities 
with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants. Our empirical model takes the following form: 
	ܦ௛ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ݄݄݉݅݃௛ ൅ ܪ௛ᇱ ߛ ൅ ܥ௖ᇱߜ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߝ௛      (5) 
The vectors H and C represent the same set of household and community variables as in 
Equation 3. The main variable of interest is the migrant household dummy mighh that 
indicates whether a household includes at least one migrant. 
3.2.3 Identifying the Impact of Migration 
We control for important dimensions of heterogeneity across migrants, households and 
communities to minimize the chance that an unobserved confounding factor might affect 
both the pattern of migration and the probability to donate. Nevertheless, in a study like 
ours that simultaneously investigates the association of many variables with one specific 
outcome, causal identification is difficult. In theory, randomization would overcome the 
problem of self-selection into migration. However, one would need to randomly assign not 
only migration, but also migration patterns including the probability to return, the strength 
of family ties, and the level of income earned abroad. Randomization across all these 
dimensions is neither practically nor ethically feasible.  
Given these constraints, we recognize that our empirical strategy does not necessarily 
identify causal effects. However, the reported associations are still useful to test the 
predictions of our theoretical framework. Most importantly, they can provide guidance to 
policymakers who seek to reach out to those parts of the diaspora that are most likely to 
donate. Migrant attributes that are robustly correlated with the probability to donate 
provide a useful starting point for targeting such groups effectively. 
In line with recent literature (e.g. McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010), we use an instrumental 
variable strategy to account for the fact that individuals self-select into migration and that 
the unobserved determinants of migration may also affect household donations. In 
particular, communities with a high prevalence of migration may well differ in some 
unobserved dimension from communities with a low prevalence of migration. Likewise, 
there may be unobserved heterogeneity between migrant and non-migrant households. 
Thus, any observed differences between “treatment” and control groups (with migration 
being the treatment) may in fact not be attributable to migration. To address this potential 
endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variable strategy. 
A valid instrument must have a direct impact on the probability to migrate, but must affect 
donations only indirectly through its impact on migration. The push and pull factors of 
migration are a natural starting point to identify a suitable instrument. Push factors relate to 
adverse conditions at home, including at the community level (e.g. economic hardship). 
Therefore, push factors may potentially have a direct impact on both migration and 
community donations. For instance, an adverse economic shock in the community of 
origin may simultaneously alter the willingness to migrate and engage in a community 
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project. Hence, push factors may not satisfy the exclusion restriction for a valid instrument. 
By contrast, pull factors refer to favorable conditions abroad (e.g. high wages). In principle, 
one would expect pull factors at the (potential) destination to be uncorrelated with the 
probability to make a donation at the origin. This is because Moldovan migrants are located 
in destinations that are far from their communities of origin. Thus, pull factors may offer a 
pool of potentially valid instruments. 
The problem remains, however, that pull factors – economic conditions abroad – do not 
vary across communities of origin. To address this problem, we use the fact that the “pull” 
exerted by economic conditions abroad is mediated through migrant networks which do 
differ across communities in Moldova. Thus our instrumental variable strategy combines 
information on destination-specific economic conditions with information on community-
specific migrant networks in different destinations. The central idea is that economic 
conditions abroad determine job opportunities for new migrants, while migrants already 
abroad channel these opportunities to their communities of origin. Since initial migrant 
networks vary across communities, communities are differentially exposed to economic 
conditions abroad. 
Migrant networks have been shown to play a key role in shaping migration flows by 
providing information on jobs abroad and lowering migration costs for subsequent 
migrants (Munshi, 2003). This observation also applies to Moldova, where local migrant 
networks are among the principal determinants of migration (Goerlich and Trebesch, 
2008). The degree of exposure to economic conditions abroad depends on the size of an 
initial migrant network as well as its location. For a given network size, a community with 
an initial migrant network at a destination with a booming economy will experience more 
emigration than a community with a migrant network of the same size at a destination with 
a stagnating economy. Over time, economic conditions abroad would exogenously 
determine the growth of a given migration network and thus drive a community’s 
migration flows. 
We use information from the 2004 census on past migration patterns to construct each 
community’s initial migrant networks across all potential destination countries. Initial 
destination-specific networks are defined as the community prevalence of migration to the 
respective destination in 1999. At that time, emigration from Moldova had just started and 
was still a very minor phenomenon in Moldova. Therefore, these initial networks have 
probably had an important impact on the size of subsequent migration flows, depending 
on the change of economic conditions in the destination countries. To capture the change 
in economic conditions abroad, we calculate the difference in unemployment rates between 
1999 and 2003 for each potential destination country. These years were decisive for 
building up of the migrant networks that shaped Moldova’s migration flows for the rest of 
the 2000s. We limit the period to 2003, so we can crosscheck with the 2004 census whether 
economic conditions abroad indeed had an impact on the level of migration. 
We expect decreasing unemployment rates to increase demand for migrant labor. We make 
the non-critical assumption that migration flows from each individual Moldovan 
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community are too small to affect the unemployment rate in the destination countries. A 
community’s exposure to economic conditions abroad E is then given by the weighted sum 
of changes in unemployment abroad, where the weight for each destination d is given by a 
community’s initial migrant network in the corresponding destination: 
 Ec ൌ ∑ ቂmigrants of community c in destination d1999population size of community c ∗ (unemploymentd2003-unemploymentd1999)ቃௗ  (6) 
We then use community exposure E as an instrument for the community prevalence of 
migration in Equations (3) and for the migrant household dummy in Equation (5). 
A hypothetical example helps to illustrate how the instrument works. Suppose there are 
two communities A and B and three potential destinations: Russia, Italy and Turkey. In 
1999, community A had 1% of its population in Russia, 2% in Italy and 1% in Turkey. 
Community B had 4% of its population in Russia and no migrants in Italy or Turkey. Note 
that both communities only differ in the composition, but not in the size of their initial 
migrant network (both communities had 4% of their population abroad). Now suppose 
that the unemployment rates of Russia, Italy and Turkey changed by -10%, +2% and -3% 
over the period 1999-2003. Communities A and B would then have experienced the 
following exposure to economic conditions abroad: 
	EA ൌ 0.01*ሺ-0.1ሻ൅0.02*0.02൅0.01*ሺ-0.03ሻൌ-0.0009	
	EB ൌ 0.04*ሺ-0.1ሻ൅0*0.02൅0*ሺ-0.03ሻൌ-0.004 
Community B is exposed to a more favorable change in unemployment abroad than 
community A because its initial migrant network happened to be located at the 
subsequently booming destination (Russia). Thus, we expect community B to see higher 
subsequent emigration than community A. 
It turns out that economic conditions varied widely across Moldova’s ten most important 
destination countries. Between 1999 and 2003, unemployment rates in Russia, Italy, 
Ukraine, Greece, Spain and France fell by 2 to 5 percentage points, whereas unemployment 
rose by 1 to 3 percentage points in Romania, Portugal, Turkey and Israel. Hence, 
Moldovan communities with different initial migrant networks were exposed to very 
different economic conditions abroad. 
A possible concern regarding the validity of our instrument is that the size and destination 
of initial migrant networks may be endogenously determined. If initial migrant networks 
are the outcome of community-specific push factors, the exclusion restriction of the 
instrument may be called into question. We address this problem by controlling for initial 
migrant networks at different destinations as separate regressors in both the first and the 
second stage of the IV estimation.  
The first stage regression to instrument for community prevalence of migration in 
Equation (3) then becomes: 
	݉݅݃ݎܽݐ݅݋݊௖ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߮ܧ௖ ൅ ݊݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇௖ௗଵଽଽଽᇱ ߠ ൅ ܯ௜ᇱߚ ൅ ܪ௛ᇱ ߛ ൅ ܥ௖ᇱߜ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߝ௖  (7) 
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where networkcd1999 is a vector of a community’s initial migrant network in different 
destinations d. 
This specification ensures that migration is driven by economic conditions from abroad 
and not by unobserved factors that correlate with the size of an initial network at a given 
destination. Our identifying assumption it that the combination of initial migrant networks at 
different destinations and the resulting exposure to economic conditions abroad does not 
affect the probability to donate directly, but only indirectly through its impact on the 
probability of migration. 
Figure A1 in the appendix demonstrates that our instrument is strongly correlated with 
migration prevalence across communities as measured by the census. Communities that 
had been exposed to larger reductions in unemployment abroad reported substantially 
higher migration prevalence rates in 2004. The F-statistic for the instrument in the 
corresponding first-stage regression with all controls is 22, far above the critical value for a 
strong instrument. 
4 Results 
4.1 Migrant Donations 
Table 3 summarizes our results on the determinants of migrant donations. It shows the 
marginal effect of each variable on the probability to make a donation to a community 
project. Most of the variables show the predicted sign and are significant. In general, we 
find support for the notion that altruism, exchange and securing community membership 
rights are important motives for donations, with an added role for community diversity. 
Column 1 presents our baseline specification with district-level fixed effects. As regards 
migrant characteristics, the number of years abroad and the frequency of communication 
have a significant and positive marginal effect. The probability to make a donation 
increases by 0.3 percentage point for every additional year spent abroad and by 5.3 
percentage points if the migrant frequently communicates with her family. These findings 
suggest that higher income and more intense emotional attachment make a donation more 
likely, which is consistent with the altruism motive. The large marginal effects for return 
intention and insecure status abroad indicate an important role for concerns about securing 
membership rights in the community of origin as a motive for donations. Those who 
intend to return are 5.2 percentage points more likely to donate. Likewise, an insecure 
status abroad is associated with a three percentage point increase in the probability to 
donate. 
As regards household characteristics, the number of dependents left behind is significantly 
and positively related with the migrant’s decision to donate. An additional child in the 
household of origin increases the probability of collective remittances by 1.8 percentage 
points, an additional elderly person by 2.5 percentage points. These results are suggestive of 
the exchange motive. The household’s living standard as proxied by household 
expenditures and assets is not significantly associated with migrant donations. 
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As regards community variables, a larger decline in night-time light during the 1990s 
(reflecting a particularly bad transition shock) makes a migrant donation more likely, 
consistent with altruism. At the same time, ethnic fractionalization in the community of 
origin discourages migrant philanthropy. If ethnic fractionalization increases by one 
standard deviation (about 0.18), a donation becomes about three percentage points less 
likely. Fractionalization matters not only at the level of the population of the community of 
origin, but also with respect to the destination countries of migrants (column 2). A one 
standard deviation increase in the fractionalization of migration flows (about 0.18) is 
associated with a decrease in the probability to donate by about 2.3 percentage points. 
Finally, migration prevalence at the community level has no significant impact – neither in 
the ordinary probit regression (column 3) nor when instrumented with exposure to 
economic conditions abroad (column 4; see Table 5, column 1 for detailed IV regression 
results). 
The remaining columns check the robustness of our baseline specification. Excluding 
district-level fixed effects does not change our main results, suggesting that there is little 
unobserved heterogeneity at the district level (column 5). Our results are also robust to 
controlling for the amount of private remittances a migrant sends to her household 
(column 6) and her destination country (column 7). 
4.2 Donations by Domestic Household Members 
First, we focus on households with migrants only and analyze the impact of different 
migration patterns (Table 4). Column 1 presents the baseline specification. Wealthier 
households and those with children are significantly more likely to donate, indicating a 
relevant role for altruistic and exchange motives. As regards migration characteristics, 
having a migrant who plans to return to Moldova increases the likelihood of a household 
donation by about ten percentage points. The large marginal effect may reflect concerns 
about the household’s reputation at present and community membership rights in the 
future. Other migration-related variables such as the frequency of communication with the 
migrant, the number of years spent abroad, or remittances received by the household 
(column 2) are not significantly associated with donations by domestic household 
members.  
As regards community variables, we do not find a significant relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and the domestic household members’ probability to donate, which 
contrasts with our earlier finding regarding donations by migrants. Perhaps household 
members in Moldova have better possibilities to directly observe and monitor how their 
donations are being used, even in an ethnically diverse environment. By contrast, migrants 
abroad may have to rely on trust to a larger extent, which may be more difficult with 
greater ethnic diversity. Similarly, there is no evidence that the fractionalization of 
migration flows across destinations affects donations by domestic household members 
(column 3). However, a higher overall prevalence of migration in the community makes a 
donation by a migrant household significantly more likely, but only when migration 
prevalence is instrumented (Columns 4 and 5; see Table 5, Column 2 for detailed IV 
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results). On the one hand, high emigration rates may burden the social structure of 
communities, suggesting an exchange motive for the donation. On the other hand, 
preferences regarding the provision of public goods in high-emigration communities may 
be more homogeneous because many households share the experience of having a family 
member abroad. 
Second, we compare households with and without migrants and do not find robust 
evidence that domestic members of households with migrants abroad are more likely to 
donate than households without migrants. The estimated coefficient for the migrant 
household dummy variable suggests a marginal effect of 4.4 percentage points under the 
simple probit model (Column 6). However, when using an IV approach to take into that 
migrant and non-migrant households are likely to differ in unobserved dimensions, the 
marginal effect is no longer significant at usual significance levels (Column 7; see Table 5, 
Column 3 for detailed IV results). In this case, the IV estimate is based on a bivariate 
probit model as both migration and donation are discrete outcomes (see Table 5, Column 3 
for detailed IV results). An alternative IV approach based on the linear probability model 
delivers the same results. 
5 Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests that community donations by migrants and by domestic members of 
their households are driven by a mix of motives. Altruism plays a role as more established 
migrants and richer households are more likely to donate. The link between donations and 
the number of children and elderly in the household suggests that donations may 
compensate the community for migrant households’ greater reliance on local public 
services and other support from community members. The large association between 
return intentions and donations, both by migrants and their domestic household members, 
suggests that donations also serve to remain in good standing with the local community 
and to secure membership rights in case the migrant eventually returns for good. 
Community diversity is also associated with the donation decision. Donations by migrants, 
but not by domestic household members, are negatively related to ethnic fractionalization 
in the community of origin. Similarly, if migrants from a given community are more 
dispersed across different host countries, they are also less likely to donate. 
Our findings provide guidance for diaspora policies that want to engage migrants in the 
provision of public goods in their communities of origin. Policies that generate incentives 
for collective remittances, for instance through matching funds, appear particularly 
promising when targeted towards migrants who do not plan to settle abroad permanently. 
This group has a high propensity to donate as they seek to preserve membership rights and 
compensate community members for extra support to left-behind family members. By 
contrast, once migrants leave permanently and are able to take their families with them, 
they become much less likely to donate to community projects at home. In these 
permanent diasporas, altruism will become the main motive for migrant donations; policy 
interventions may usefully focus on encouraging frequent contact with any friends and 
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relatives still in the country of origin, along with strengthening professional links. 
Promoting good inter-ethnic relations, apart from providing other benefits, may also 
increase migrants’ inclination to donate. 
In the specific case of Moldova, many migrants works in Russia where living and working 
conditions are often difficult. Therefore, few choose to remain in Russia indefinitely. For 
these migrants, incentives for donations are likely to fall on fertile ground. At the same 
time, high-income destination countries in the EU and elsewhere have become more 
prominent, especially among young, well-educated Moldovans. These migrants rarely plan 
to return to Moldova but typically seek to establish permanent legal status abroad and to 
take their families along. For this group, a diaspora strategy that appeals to migrants’ 
altruism seems most promising.  
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Tables 
TABLE 1: THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
 
Altruism Exchange 
Community 
membership 
rights 
Community 
diversity 
Migrant variables     
Migrant’s links to 
family/community +  +  
Migrant’s income 
abroad ++ + –/+  
Migrant’s return 
intention/insecure 
status abroad 
  ++  
Household variables     
Children/elderly left 
behind in migrant’s 
family 
 ++ +  
Income/wealth of 
migrant’s family left 
behind 
+  +  
Community variables     
Community 
development ––  +  
Community 
prevalence of 
migration 
 +  + 
Community 
fractionalization of 
migration flows 
   –– 
Community ethnic 
fractionalization –  – –– 
Note: “++” and “—“ indicate a firm prediction. 
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TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT AND HOUSEHOLD DONATIONS ACROSS 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMMUNITY PROJECTS 
 
Notes: Based on 135 migrant and 2328 household donations. In 
addition, 154 migrant and 671 household donations to the church 
were recorded. 7 percent of migrants, 43 percent of migrant 
households and 33 percent of non-migrant households donated to a 
community project. 
  
Migrants
Migrant 
households
Non-migrant 
households
School 30% 25% 21%
Kindergarten 20% 19% 17%
Water/sanitation 15% 14% 13%
Gas 12% 14% 12%
Road 8% 10% 13%
Health center/hospital 5% 5% 5%
Orphanages 4% 5% 5%
Other 5% 8% 14%
Total 100% 100% 100%
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TABLE 3: MIGRANT DONATIONS, MARGINAL EFFECTS (ROBUST S.E. IN PARENTHESES) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
baseline
community 
fractionaliza-
tion of 
migration 
flows
community 
migration 
prevalence 
(probit)
community 
migration 
prevalence 
(IV probit)
without 
district fixed 
effects
controlling 
for family 
remittances
controlling 
for migrant 
destination
0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.005 0.002 0.004 0.019 0.010 -0.002 -0.001
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014)
0.022 0.019 0.022 0.044 0.013 0.031 0.024
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.016) (0.022) (0.019)
-0.028 -0.031* -0.029 -0.056** -0.025 -0.039* -0.030
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018)
0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.090** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.050***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.037) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
0.030** 0.029** 0.029** 0.018 0.022* 0.029** 0.028**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
0.053*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.076*** 0.036** 0.056*** 0.054***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018)
0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.003 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
0.025** 0.022* 0.026** 0.004 0.015 0.028** 0.026**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
-0.024 -0.014 -0.008 -0.002 0.025 -0.010 -0.015
(0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.091) (0.051) (0.065) (0.059)
0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
-0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009* 0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.126*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.177*** -0.066* -0.143*** -0.121***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.064) (0.035) (0.053) (0.045)
-0.175*** -0.193*** -0.169*** -0.080 -0.135*** -0.176*** -0.180***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.096) (0.049) (0.061) (0.055)
-0.033 -0.028 -0.037 0.012 -0.064* -0.024 -0.036
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.068) (0.034) (0.047) (0.040)
0.038* 0.052** 0.035 0.122* 0.002 0.029 0.040*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.067) (0.015) (0.027) (0.022)
0.041 0.047 0.049 0.141* 0.038 0.052 0.042
(0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.085) (0.036) (0.071) (0.056)
-0.130**
(0.058)
-0.003 0.056
(0.002) (0.039)
0.006**
(0.003)
0.012
(0.029)
0.028
(0.022)
district fixed effects yes yes yes yes no yes yes
observations 994 994 994 994 1,281 815 994
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
migrant to Russia
community prevalence of 
migration (%)
community fractionalization 
of migration flows
community ethnic 
fractionalization
community per-capita social 
expenditures (MDL)
community population size (in 
10000)
community ratio high-
skilled/low-skilled individuals
remittances sent by migrant (in 
1000 USD)
migrant to Europe, US or 
Canada
change night-time light 1992-
1999
age
male
higher education
married
plans to return
problems abroad
communicates several times 
per week
years abroad
number of children 0-16 years 
in hh
number of elderly 65- years in 
hh
hh per-capita expenditures (in 
10000 MDL)
hh wealth index
community night-time light 
1992
24 
TABLE 4: HOUSEHOLD DONATIONS, MARGINAL EFFECTS (ROBUST S.E. IN PARENTHESES) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
baseline
controlling 
for family 
remittances
community 
fractionaliza-
tion of 
migration 
flows
community 
migration 
prevalence 
(probit)
community 
migration 
prevalence 
(IV probit)
Probit
IV (bivariate 
probit)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
0.014 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.010 0.009 -0.014
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.067) (0.036) (0.018)
0.053 0.055 0.058 0.054 0.065 0.047* 0.007
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.025) (0.012)
0.066 0.063 0.072 0.066 0.076 0.107*** 0.068***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.033) (0.025)
0.047** 0.046** 0.049** 0.047** 0.037* 0.038*** 0.029***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.012) (0.009)
-0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.038 -0.032 -0.045***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.020) (0.017)
0.214 0.167 0.217 0.205 0.174 0.208 0.070
(0.251) (0.253) (0.251) (0.251) (0.243) (0.154) (0.059)
0.031** 0.029* 0.032** 0.031** 0.020 0.039*** 0.014***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.004)
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.007** -0.004***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
0.083 0.080 0.077 0.080 0.043 0.002 0.020
(0.115) (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115) (0.070) (0.034)
0.023 0.026 0.063 0.020 0.007 -0.017 -0.066
(0.145) (0.146) (0.148) (0.145) (0.144) (0.073) (0.043)
0.077 0.083 0.085 0.087 0.238* 0.065 -0.025
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.124) (0.060) (0.032)
-0.088 -0.092* -0.104* -0.084 0.028 -0.037 -0.011
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.078) (0.029) (0.014)
0.009 0.012 -0.024 0.001 -0.019 0.037 0.011
(0.113) (0.113) (0.116) (0.112) (0.106) (0.055) (0.028)
0.102* 0.102* 0.106** 0.104* 0.121**
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052)
0.034 0.035 0.030 0.033 0.007
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043)
-0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 0.013
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.008
(0.007)
0.216
(0.162)
0.004 0.069**
(0.006) (0.035)
0.044** 0.069
(0.021) (0.090)
district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
observations 915 915 915 915 915 2,736 2,736
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
community prevalence of 
migration (%)
community population size (in 
10000)
community ratio high-
skilled/low-skilled individuals
migrant household
hh per-capita expenditures (in 
10000 MDL)
hh wealth index
community night-time light 
1992
change night-time light 1992-
1999
community ethnic 
fractionalization
community per-capita social 
expenditures (MDL)
community fractionalization 
of migration flows
hh with migrant who plans to 
return
hh with migrant who has had 
problems abroad
hh with migrant who 
communicates often
years since departure of first 
migrant member
remittances received by hh (in 
1000 USD)
migrant households only
number of elderly 65- years in 
hh
all households
age hh head
male hh head
higher education hh head
married hh head
number of children 0-16 years 
in hh
25 
TABLE 5: 1ST AND 2ND STAGE IV REGRESSIONS, COEFFICIENTS (ROBUST S.E. IN PARENTHESES) 
 
  
second stage first stage second stage first stage second stage first stage
dependent variable
migrant 
donation
community 
prevalence 
of migration
migrant 
household 
donation
community 
prevalence 
of migration
household 
donation
migrant 
household
0.017** -0.013 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
0.103 -0.188 0.026 0.004 0.048 -0.150
(0.110) (0.160) (0.170) (0.316) (0.103) (0.095)
0.222* -0.349* 0.164 -0.259 0.132* -0.085
(0.124) (0.187) (0.116) (0.207) (0.068) (0.063)
-0.282** 0.267 0.195 -0.130 0.248** 0.248***
(0.137) (0.190) (0.164) (0.300) (0.125) (0.092)
0.622*** -0.441**
(0.193) (0.218)
0.097 0.382**
(0.144) (0.167)
0.372*** -0.186
(0.126) (0.185)
0.011 0.034*
(0.015) (0.020)
0.093 0.118 0.093* 0.085 0.078 0.133***
(0.064) (0.078) (0.053) (0.086) (0.053) (0.030)
0.023 0.549*** -0.097 0.464** -0.049 -0.281***
(0.148) (0.148) (0.108) (0.190) (0.091) (0.053)
-0.012 0.663 0.441 0.107 0.504
(0.482) (0.811) (0.615) (1.010) (0.409)
0.024 0.063 0.052 0.101 0.103***
(0.044) (0.070) (0.042) (0.074) (0.023)
-0.050*** 0.117*** -0.024 0.102*** -0.019** -0.009
(0.017) (0.027) (0.016) (0.029) (0.009) (0.008)
-0.944** 0.139 0.108 0.702 0.006 0.138
(0.470) (0.492) (0.291) (0.576) (0.191) (0.183)
-0.425 -1.986** 0.019 -0.553 -0.167 -0.311
(0.629) (0.784) (0.364) (0.841) (0.227) (0.199)
0.063 -1.030** 0.603* -2.404*** 0.245 -0.431***
(0.349) (0.509) (0.312) (0.507) (0.191) (0.163)
0.648*** -1.286*** 0.070 -1.582*** -0.086 0.010
(0.217) (0.283) (0.198) (0.269) (0.079) (0.075)
0.750 -0.439 -0.047 0.041 0.039 0.042
(0.512) (0.512) (0.269) (0.419) (0.151) (0.142)
0.298*** 0.176**
(0.087) (0.089)
-2.689*** 1.100 -0.469 0.282 0.317** -1.685***
(0.718) (0.981) (0.490) (1.037) (0.144) (0.626)
-1.187 3.214*** -1.528** 4.043*** -0.346 -0.781*
(0.859) (0.949) (0.759) (1.066) (0.281) (0.450)
-3.325*** 6.997*** -1.078 6.607*** 0.408* -0.637***
(0.562) (0.696) (0.749) (0.793) (0.221) (0.219)
2.358*** 2.465*** 0.351***
(0.480) (0.522) (0.127)
(1) (3)(2)
migrants all households
Table 3, Column 4 Table 4, Column 5 Table 4, Column 7
Bivariate probit
number of children 0-16 years in hh
migrant households
community prevalence of migration 
(%)
age
male
higher education
married
plans to return
problems abroad
communicates several times per 
week
years abroad
IV probit IV probit
community prevalence of migration 
to other countries in 1999 (%)
number of elderly 65- years in hh
hh per-capita expenditures (in 
10000 MDL)
hh wealth index
community night-time light 1992
change night-time light 1992-1999
community ethnic fractionalization
community per-capita social 
expenditures (MDL)
community population size (in 
10000)
community ratio high-skilled/low-
skilled individuals
community prevalence of migration 
to Russia in 1999 (%)
community prevalence of migration 
to Italy in 1999 (%)
community exposure to 
employment opportunities abroad
26 
 
0.314** -0.467*
(0.139) (0.252)
0.017 0.459***
(0.110) (0.178)
0.032 -0.215
(0.106) (0.195)
0.008 0.004
(0.011) (0.020)
0.496
(0.720)
-0.885** -0.450* -0.234
(0.400) (0.258) (0.470)
0.863*** 0.864***
(0.022) (0.023)
F-statistic of instrument 22.19 20.99 12.22
district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
observations
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
994 2,736915
/athrho
/lnsigma
hh with migrant who plans to 
return
hh with migrant who has had 
problems abroad
hh with migrant who 
communicates often
years since departure of first 
migrant member
migrant household
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Appendix 
TABLE A1: SUMMARY STATISTICS MIGRANT SAMPLE BY DONATION 
 
 
TABLE A2: SUMMARY STATISTICS MIGRANT HOUSEHOLD SAMPLE BY DONATION 
 
 
  
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
age 34.88 9.94 38.38 10.99
male 0.62 0.49 0.68 0.47
higher education 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43
married 0.64 0.48 0.73 0.44
plans to return 0.82 0.38 0.96 0.21
problems abroad 0.65 0.48 0.77 0.43
communicates several times per week 0.31 0.46 0.48 0.50
years abroad 4.54 4.10 5.94 4.58
number of children 0-16 years in hh 0.90 1.02 1.33 1.39
number of elderly 65- years in hh 0.23 0.52 0.28 0.62
hh per-capita expenditures (in 10000 MDL) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08
hh wealth index -0.10 1.28 0.08 1.24
community night-time light 1992 6.39 5.31 6.36 5.97
change night-time light 1992-1999 -0.77 0.21 -0.82 0.16
community prevalence of migration (%) 9.86 3.86 9.08 2.87
community fractionalization of migrant flows 0.51 0.18 0.48 0.17
community ethnic fractionalization 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.12
community per-capita social expenditures (MDL) 0.61 0.20 0.53 0.24
community population size (in 10000) 0.49 0.52 0.46 0.51
community ratio high-skilled/low-skilled 0.26 0.28 0.22 0.24
remittances sent by migrant (in 1000 USD) 0.90 1.92 1.52 3.90
migrant to Europe, US or Canada 0.30 0.46 0.20 0.40
migrant to Russia 0.62 0.49 0.72 0.45
donation=0 donation=1
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
age hh head 52.83 13.51 49.41 11.86
male hh head 0.78 0.42 0.85 0.36
higher education hh head 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42
married hh head 0.74 0.44 0.83 0.37
number of children 0-16 years in hh 0.77 1.04 1.01 0.99
number of elderly 65- years in hh 0.32 0.60 0.21 0.49
hh per-capita expenditures (in 10000 MDL) 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09
hh wealth index -0.32 1.31 -0.06 1.26
community night-time light 1992 7.09 5.93 6.33 5.28
change night-time light 1992-1999 -0.77 0.18 -0.79 0.20
community prevalence of migration (%) 9.86 3.86 9.70 3.74
community fractionalization of migrant flows 0.52 0.18 0.51 0.17
community ethnic fractionalization 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.18
community per-capita social expenditures (MDL) 0.61 0.20 0.58 0.20
community population size (in 10000) 0.54 0.58 0.45 0.48
community ratio high-skilled/low-skilled 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.26
hh with migrant who plans to return 0.81 0.39 0.88 0.33
hh with migrant who has had problems abroad 0.66 0.47 0.64 0.48
hh with migrant who communicates often 0.25 0.43 0.34 0.47
years since departure of first migrant member 4.97 4.15 5.31 4.35
remittances received by hh (in 1000 USD) 0.92 1.91 1.10 2.67
donation=0 donation=1
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TABLE A3: SUMMARY STATISTICS HOUSEHOLD SAMPLE BY DONATION 
 
 
FIGURE A1: COMMUNITY-LEVEL EXPOSURE TO CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
ABROAD (1999-2003) AND MIGRATION PREVALENCE IN 2004 
 
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
age hh head 56.21 14.42 51.08 12.93
male hh head 0.74 0.44 0.84 0.36
higher education hh head 0.19 0.40 0.25 0.43
married hh head 0.68 0.47 0.81 0.39
number of children 0-16 years in hh 0.58 0.95 0.87 0.98
number of elderly 65- years in hh 0.48 0.69 0.29 0.58
hh per-capita expenditures (in 10000 MDL) 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07
hh wealth index -0.68 1.40 -0.20 1.34
migrant household 0.39 0.49 0.50 0.50
community night-time light 1992 7.81 6.09 6.89 5.72
change night-time light 1992-1999 -0.77 0.17 -0.78 0.19
community prevalence of migration (%) 9.56 3.83 9.61 3.71
community fractionalization of migrant flows 0.51 0.19 0.51 0.18
community ethnic fractionalization 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.19
community per-capita social expenditures (MDL) 0.62 0.21 0.60 0.19
community population size (in 10000) 0.58 0.61 0.51 0.54
community ratio high-skilled/low-skilled 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.30
donation=0 donation=1
0
5
10
15
20
25
M
ig
ra
tio
n 
pr
ev
al
en
ce
 in
 2
00
4 
(%
)
-.0004 -.0003 -.0002 -.0001 0
Exposure to changes in unemployment abroad 1999-2003
